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Margarito Rodriguez timely appeals following

two separate

counts of Sexual Abuse of Y.R and S.T., after the district court allowed the prosecutor
to proffer unsworn testimony at trial that was inconsistent with the witness' direct
examination testimony.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Rodriguez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference.
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the prosecutor to
due
rights

during direct
right to a

trial?
2.

Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing
Mr. Rodriguez to cross examine her thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution?

3.

Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct
by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the detective to give his opinion
about what he saw on the video, State's Exhibit #19, to the jury?

4.

Did the district court err when it improperly commented on the evidence by
admonishing the jury to only consider the video and the narrative for the charge
against Mr. Rodriguez involving S.T., thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury?

2

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Right To Due Process And Right To A Fair
Trial

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify, resulting in

inadmissible, unsworn testimony presented to a jury. This violated Mr. Rodriguez's
rights to due process and a fair trial.

B.

The District Court's Error Violated Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process And Right To A
Fair Trial Which Resulted In Fundamental Error
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section I of his Appellant's Brief and

will not repeat those arguments here (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16), but will directly
address the claims made in the State's Response regarding the unsworn testimony of
the prosecutor. The State alleges that admission of Ms. Kallin's question to S.T. does
not rise to the level of fundamental error because it didn't violate Mr. Rodriguez's
constitutional rights. (Respondent's Brief. pp.5-14.) In doing so, the State tries to
eliminate the prejudicial effect of Ms. Kallin's question by rephrasing it as "Do you
remember us talking about that?" (Respondent's Brief, p.6.) Further, it defines
Ms. Kallin's inadmissible testimony "And do you remember when you were talking to
me, I asked you about any time that you had seen your father masturbate and you
indicated you remembered one time ... ," as setting "forth the factual premise of the
question." (Id. at 7.) Regardless of the form in which the information was conveyed to
the jury, "a prosecutor must 'guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of
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them from considering only the evidence introduced."'

tend to

(1903)). The

(quoting

715

1

V.

V.

9

and

of Ms. Kallin's testimony prejudiced the

hindered them from considering only the evidence introduced.

C.

Ms. Kallin's Unsworn Testimony Violated Rule 3.7 Of The Idaho Rule Of
Professional Conduct (1.R.C.P.) Which Prohibits Attorneys From Testifying In A
Case In Which The Attorney Is Involved
The State argues Mr. Rodriguez's reliance on I.R.C.P 3.7 is misplaced. First, it

argues

because

the

rule

has

no

constitutional

significance,

it

is

irrelevant.

(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) This argument does not take into account the basis for
I R.C.P

3.7, which is grounded in constitutional protections. The commentary to

I R.P.C. 3.7 states "the tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be
confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness." This safeguard
ensures there is no blurring of the line between the role of attorney and witness in the
eyes of the jury. The commentary further delineates between witness and advocate,
stating "[a] witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an
advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others." Further,
the rule assumes that without such a rule, "it may not be clear whether a statement by
an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof." Here, the
prosecutor's unsworn testimony was based on her own personal knowledge, i.e., a
conversation she had with S.T. She was not acting as an advocate when she explained
and commented on S.T.'s testimony, that she never saw her father masturbate.
Contrary to the State's claim, this distinction is relevant because Mr. Rodriguez's due
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his right to a fair and impartial jury were violated when the prosecutor
unsworn

subject
ignores State v.

cross
135

the
894

App.

2001 ). The issue in Aguilar was whether the prosecutor's inducement of a witness to
participate in a sting operation in exchange for a reduction of pending charges, made
the prosecuting attorney a necessary witness for the defense. The defendant alleged
the prosecutor violated of I.R.C.P 3.7 by testifying in a case where the prosecutor
represented one of the parties. The defendant challenged the district court's
determination that the prosecuting attorney not be disqualified from representing the
State in its prosecution of him. Id. at 895. The Court of Appeals acknowledged no Idaho
appellate court has directly addressed the circumstances under which a defendant
should be allowed to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness. Id. The Aguilar Court
analyzed United States v. Prantil, 764 F .2d 548 (91h Cir. 1985), in which the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's
motion for substitution of an alternative prosecutor, where the prosecutor was a
testifying witness in the trial. Aguilar, 135 Idaho at 896. Aguilar acknowledged that the
Prantil Court, in coming to that conclusion, determined that the prosecuting attorney

was a witness to and a participant in, some aspect of all of the events alleged in the
indictment. Aguilar, 135 Idaho at 896. Aguilar, however, found Prantil distinguishable. In
so concluding, the Court determined that the prosecuting attorney was not a participant
in or a witness to the acts or transaction upon which the defendant's prosecution was
based. Id. Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined that the defendant had not shown
a "compelling need" to call the prosecutor as a witness. Id. Unlike Aguilar, the
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prosecuting attorney here witnessed a statement which was material to the event
in

indictment,

Rodriguez masturbate.

S.T.

Ms.

has shown a compelling need

Rod

saw
call

Ms. Kallin as a witness.
The State argues even if the prosecutor's question was improper, the defendant
engaged in the same tactic when cross-examining S.T. (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11 .)
The State alleges that while cross examining S.T., the defendant asked her whether she
remembered telling Mrs. Perry, who was with the Nampa Family Justice Center, that
S.T. never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Id. The State misstates Mr. Rodriguez's
argument. Mr. Rodriguez's question was consistent with the testimony of S.T.;
Ms. Kallin's testimony was inconsistent with S.T.'s testimony. Mr. Rodriguez's concern
in this case is not the proposal of factual scenarios, but rather the proposal of factual
scenarios inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial.
Another reason the State argues I.R.C.P. 3.7 is inapplicable is "because the
prosecutor was not 'likely to be a necessary witness."' (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) The
State cites I.R.E. 613(b) as support, stating "prior statements may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence." Id. I.R.E. 613(b) provides "extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent
statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to
explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to
interrogate the witness thereon ... "Although it is not clear from their brief, this argument
actually favors Mr. Rodriguez. The extrinsic evidence in this case is Ms. Kallin's
testimony that S.T. said she saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. S.T. denied she said this.
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under the State's reading of 613(b), the testimony from Ms. Kallin
it was extrinsic
lastly,

Rodriguez's I.RC.

State argues that

7 argument

is

inapplicable because the Supreme Court of the United States specifically rejected this
sort of analysis in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U S. 209 (1982). 2 (Respondent's Brief, p.8.) In

Smith, the appellant argued that the prosecutor withheld the fact that a juror applied to
be an investigator in the prosecutor's office. Smith 455 U S. at 209. The court found no
harm to the defendant because the analysis for prosecutorial misconduct is fairness of
the trial, not conduct of the prosecutor. Id at 219. In contrast, Mr. Rodriguez alleges
prosecutorial misconduct, which impacted the fairness of his trial, not the conduct of the
prosecutor. For instance, in Issue I, Mr. Rodriguez alleges his right to due process and
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury and his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitutions were violated.
None of these issues focus on the "culpability of the prosecutor", but focus on how the
prosecutor's misconduct resulted in various violations of Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional
rights.

I.R.E. 613 (b) would bar Ms. Kallin from testifying what S.T. told her in an interview.
S.T. denied she made the statement. However, Mr. Rodriguez was never given the
opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Kallin regarding this statement. Mr. Rodriguez asserts
this error violated his due process rights under the United States Constitution.
2 The State cites Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 940, 219 (1982). Mr. Rodriguez assumes
this was a typographical error and intended to cite it as Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
(1982).
1

7

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give The Jury Any Limiting
Instructions To Ensure The Unsworn Testimony Was Not Used For An Improper

State claims "Mr. Rodriguez

cherry-picked the

present a

misleading argument." (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) In support of this conclusion, the
State minimizes the effect of and actually ignores any prejudice the instructions had on
Mr. Rodriguez's ability to have a fair trial. Mr. Rodriguez, in his Appellant's Brief, fleshed
out the way in which Ms. Kallin's misconduct effected the trial. First, the court told the
jury that opening statements are not in evidence. (Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.1.)
Second, immediately prior to opening statements, the Court told the jury "you must
decide the case only on the evidence received in court." (Tr., p.179, Ls.15-17.) In
opening statements, Ms. Voss told the jury "you will also hear from the defendant's
other daughter, [S.T.] She's 14 today. [S.T.] will talk to you about seeing her father
masturbate in front of her." (Tr., p.181, Ls.4-7.)
The State acknowledges that the district court instructed the jury that it was to
base its verdict on the evidence, and that the statements of the lawyers were not in
evidence. (Tr., p.349, L.13 - p.350, L.5 ) However, the State ignores the fact when the
district court gave that instruction to the jury, it was after all of the evidence was
presented. That instruction was given after the State told the jury "S.T. will talk to you
about seeing her father masturbate in front of her." (Tr.,

181, Ls.4-7.) That instruction

was given after S.T. denied seeing her father masturbate. That instruction was given
after Ms. Kallin told the jury that S.T. said she saw her father masturbate. The State, in
an attempt to show Mr. Rodriguez failed to show prejudice, argues "it did not ultimately
rise to the level of denying Mr. Rodriguez's due process right to a fair trial."
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stand

conclusion, the State claims it

Brief, p.12.) Based upon

unsworn

Jury
however, is

Ms.

m

case.

During deliberations, the jury returned with two questions, only one of which is
relevant here. (Tr., p.371, L.6

p.380, L 11.) Jurors asked, "Instruction 32: Is inducing,

causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct, sufficient cause
to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we conclude the victim did not actually
see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?" (R., p.230 (emphasis in
original).) The Court, with agreement of the parties, told the jury to answer the question
by reading the instruction. (Tr., p.381, L.4 - p.382, L.5.) Instruction 32 deals specifically
with the allegation of Sexual Abuse of a Child, S.T. The portion of the instruction the
jury had a question about states: "3. the defendant Margarito Rodriguez induced,
caused or permitted S.T. (D.O.B: 5/23/2000) to witness an act of sexual conduct."
(R., p.217.)

The State correctly acknowledged that to show error Mr. Rodriguez "would

have to show that the jury ignored its instructions, considered the question as evidence,
and rendered a different verdict than it would have based on other evidence, which
included a video of the act in question." 3 (Respondent's Brief, p.13.) The State argues
Mr. Rodriguez failed to make this showing
S.T. testified she never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. This testimony, if

believed, would require the jury to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the charge involving S.T. The

3 Mr. Rodriguez incorporates here his Appellant Brief argument regarding the video.
Mr. Rodriguez will also address select issues raised by the State, regarding the video
later in this brief.
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the jury considered the prosecutor's unsworn testimony in

Cross-Examining S.T. Does Not Cure The Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Due
Process Rights. As S.T. Is Not The Witness Who Made The Statement
The State, in an effort to prove Mr. Rodriguez has failed to prove prejudice,
argues that Mr. Rodriguez had ample opportunity to cross-examine S.T. (Respondent's
Brief, p.12.) This argument does not address how the admission of Ms. Kallin's
testimony prejudiced Mr. Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights were violated
when Ms. Kallin provided unsworn testimony, not subject to cross-examination. It is
illogical for defense counsel to cross-examine S.T., as S.T. testified she never saw
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Mr. Rodriguez's rights were violated when he was unable to
cross examine Ms. Kallin, not S.T.
The State diminishes the effect the jury's question had on Mr. Rodriguez's due
process rights. Specifically, the State sees no difference between the jury question
"whether inducing, causing or permitting opportunity to witness" and the jury instruction
which required that Mr. Rodriguez "induced, caused or permitted S.T. to witness an act
of sexual conduct" (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) Absent from the State's analysis is
the presence of the word "opportunity" The state's argument is that "nothing in the
question or answer indicated that the jury improperly considered the prosecutor's
question to be evidence." (Id. at 14). This is not consistent with the evidence in the
case. The only admissible testimony regarding this issue is from S.T., who said she
never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. Therefore, if the jury relied on the admissible
testimony only, they would have returned a not guilty verdict on this count. The
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unsworn testimony, coupled with the court's improper instructions, is the
jury,

could

he induced, caused or permitted S.T.

question,
witness an

of

sexual conduct, but believed he only permitted the opportunity. Mr. Rodriguez's
conviction was based on consideration of evidence other than S.T.'s testimony,
specifically Ms. Kallin's testimony, as hers was the only testimony that S.T. told saw
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of
Mr. Rodriguez's Rights Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment To
The United States Constitution
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section II of the Appellant's Brief
here but Mr. Rodriguez will address directly the claims made in the State's response
regarding Mr. Rodriguez's right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The State argues that the prosecutor's question was
not an out-of-court testimonial statement, but rather an in-court question by counsel
regarding an out-of-court statement by a witness on the stand. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.9-10.) This is simply not the case. S

denied telling Ms. Kallin she saw her father

masturbate. (Tr., p.230, L.25 - p.231, L.4.) Therefore, the statement that S.T. said she
saw her father masturbate is attributed to Ms. Kallin, not S.T. Mr. Rodriguez's due
process rights were violated because he didn't have an opportunity to cross examine
Ms. Kallin. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) Most importantly, the district court erred when it
allowed Ms. Kallin to testify without being subject to cross-examination. Placing
Ms. Kallin under oath, subject to cross examination, would have been the only way to
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cure

prejud

once the court allowed

constitutional

violated
on

testify. Allowing Ms. Kallin to testify
error

Mr. Rodriguez was prejudiced as a result

II L
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Engage In Misconduct By
Offering Facts Not In Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About
What He Saw On State's Exhibit 19, A Video 4 , To The Jury
Mr. Rodriguez incorporates his argument in Section Ill of his Appellant's Brief,
but will address the claims made in the State's response, that the error did not rise to
the level of fundamental error by relieving the State of proving its burden of whether
Mr. Rodriguez was masturbating in front of S.T. (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) The State
alleges Mr. Rodriguez has failed to show fundamental error in the limiting instruction
and testimony regarding Exhibit 19. (Respondent's Brief, pp.15-19), and claims that
Mr. Rodriguez's argument is specious. (Respondent's Brief, p.18.) To the contrary,
considering only the admissible evidence would warrant an acquittal on this charge The
only way for the jury to find Mr. Rodriguez guilty was for it to consider evidence that was
improperly admitted, specifically the detective's opinion about what he believed was on
State's Exhibit 19, a video. S.T.'s testimony did not support the detective's narrative.
Therefore, two of the most important factual determinations for the jury, whether the
man in the video masturbated, and whether it was done in front of S.T., came from

Ms. Kallin's unsworn testimony, which was affirmed by the detective's testimony stating

The State alleges that Exhibit 19 is not in the record on appeal and must be presumed
to support the verdict. (Respondent's Brief, p.13 n.6.) Exhibit 19 was retained by
Canyon County District Court as required by I.C.R. 16(m)(1) but it was included in the
Certificate of Exhibits. (R., p.278.)
4
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opinion about the contents of the video. The only admissible evidence, S
in an acquittal.

this

proving

's
a

resulting in fundamental error.

IV.

The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence By
Admonishing The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 19) And The
Detective's Narrative For The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving S.T., Thereby
Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury
The state oversimplifies and mischaracterizes Mr. Rodriguez's argument.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19.) In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Rodriguez argues the
district court made improper comments on the evidence when it admonished the jury to
only consider the video and the narrative for the charge involving S.T., and these
improper comments violated his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. (Appellant
Brief, pp.26-29.) The State mischaracterizes Mr. Rodriguez's argument as being "that
the district court committed fundamental error by giving the instruction limiting the jury's
consideration to the admissible components of Exhibit 1 " (Respondent's Brief, pp.1819.) The State's reframing of this argument is incorrect. Mr. Rodriguez maintains the
district court erred when it allowed Detective Bryant to give his opinion, that the male in
the video, State's Exhibit 19, was masturbating, which was an offer of facts not in
evidence. By extension, Mr. Rodriguez maintains the district court also erred when it
instructed the jury it could only consider the video and narrative for the charge involving
S.T, because the court offered facts not in evidence. One argument focuses on
Detective Bryant's narrative, while the other focuses on the court's improper comment
on the evidence. The court's improper comment on the evidence relieved the State of its
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of proving the person in the video was Mr. Rodriguez, that the other person in
was
someone else, was

it was Mr. Rodriguez or.

the jury, not

not

Unlike the

constitutional right was even implicated ... " (Respondent's Brief, p.19.), this error
violated Mr. Rodriguez's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. Because the court
offered an improper comment on the evidence, Mr. Rodriguez was not given a fair trial
before an impartial jury.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above and in the Appellant's Brief, this Court should
vacate Mr. Rodriguez's conviction relating to S.T. and remand to the district court for
further proceedings.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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